John B. Magruder and the Siege of Yorktown
In March of 1862, Union General George B. McClellan outflanked the Confederate main army in Northern Virginia by landing 121,000 men on the Virginia Peninsula to the south, between the James and York rivers. The goal was to march up the Peninsula and capture Richmond before the Confederates had time to rush in reinforcements to protect their capital, and things went smoothly at first, as McClellan successfully disembarked with no difficulty, and began marching to Richmond.
The only opposition standing between McClellan and Richmond were 12,000 Confederates at Yorktown, commanded by John B. Magruder and outnumbered 10 to 1 by Union forces. Magruder, realizing his small force stood no chance in a fight, and desperately needing to buy time until reinforcements arrived, set out to bamboozle McClellan into slowing down.
Fortunately for the Confederates, Magruder was the right man in the right place at the right time. Renown before the war for his florid manner and proneness to theatrics and ostentatious displays, Magruder resorted to theatrics and display to put on a show and trick McClellan into believing that he faced far stronger opposition than was the case. Taking advantage of the small Warwick river which separated him from the advancing federals, Magruder set out to convince McClellan that its 14-mile length on the opposite bank was heavily fortified and strongly garrisoned. While the fortifications were real, Magruder lacked the men to occupy them in any strength that could have stopped McClellan had he attacked.
Magruder directed his forces to create a din, with drumrolls and men cheering in woods behind the lines, to fool their foes into believing there were far more Confederates in the vicinity than was the case. He also employed the same column of men over and over, marching them within sight of the federals to take up positions on the defensive line, then slipping away outside the Union observers’ line of sight, reassembling in column, and marching back to the defensive line to take up defensive positions once more.
With such theatrics, Magruder convinced McClellan that the Confederate positions were too strong for a frontal attack – a task made easier by McClellan’s predisposition to take counsel of his fears and believe himself outnumbered. On April 5, 1862, the Union commander ordered a halt on his side of the Warwick River, had his men dig in, and set out to conduct a siege when he could have simply bulled through, swatted Magruder aside, and seized Richmond as it was his for the taking.
For a month, McClellan methodically prepared for a huge attack to break through Magruder’s “strong defenses”, concentrating men, guns, and munitions for a massive bombardment scheduled for May 5, 1862, followed by an overwhelming attack. Having already bought his side a month to prepare for the defense of Richmond, Magruder slipped away on the night of May 3, leaving behind empty trenches for the enemy to occupy. McClellan resumed his advance on Richmond, but by then the Confederates had concentrated sufficient forces to thwart him.