6. The Cuban Missile Crisis was largely over political appearances
In October of 1962 the United States had a nuclear arsenal of about 5,000 warheads which could be delivered to their target by strategic bombers, tactical bombers, ICBMs, submarine launched missiles, and intermediate and medium range missiles, as well as a few other means which had been tried experimentally. By comparison, the Soviet Union had an arsenal of about 300 warheads. The presence of the warheads in Cuba was not an alteration of the strategic balance between the two nations, especially because the United States had nuclear warheads aimed at the Soviets based in Turkey, the Jupiters. The Jupiter system was generally considered obsolete, not because the missiles were old and wouldn’t work, but because the submarine launched missiles rendered them redundant.
The presence of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, if allowed to remain, didn’t alter the strategic balance between the superpowers as much as it affected the political balance, a fact which Kennedy admitted and explained after the crisis was resolved. The majority of the staff of advisors which he gathered to assist him, and which he named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) agreed with his assessment (EXCOMM was the NSC and five additional advisers, including Bobby Kennedy). Kennedy had already promised the American people that should Cuba acquire the means to attack the United States, “the United States would act”. Kennedy was thus cornered by the need to redress the situation in Cuba without endangering Berlin.