The torpedo problem, Pacific Theatre, 1941-1943
American submarines went to war in the Pacific with well trained professional crews, and from the beginning inflicted damage on the Japanese Navy and merchant fleet. But they could have inflicted far greater if the US Navy bureaucracy had recognized sooner the severe problems encountered with the submarine’s primary offensive weapon, the torpedo. Submarine skippers repeatedly reported torpedoes which hit the target, or passed beneath it, when its magnetic exploder should have detected the proximity of the enemy vessel and detonated. The Navy bureaucracy blamed the failures on the skippers, claiming that the torpedoes worked perfectly.
Torpedoes also had a disturbing habit of running in a circle and returning to the point from which they were launched. At least two American submarines were sunk by their own torpedoes in this manner, confirmed by survivors among their crews who became prisoners of war. The US Navy did not fully address the issue of the faulty weapons until 1943, after which the US submarine fleet became the most lethal weapon in the US naval arsenal. American submarines sank more than 55% of the Japanese tonnage sent to the bottom in the Pacific War, though less than 2% of naval personnel served in submarines. Had it not been for bureaucratic obstinacy, that number would have been much higher.