Naval Intelligence chain, Pacific Fleet, 1941
In 1941, the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband Kimmel, received intelligence information on the growing Japanese threat directly from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. Incredibly, information gathered by Pacific listening posts and deciphered in Hawaii was transmitted to Washington, bypassing the commander of the Pacific Fleet, who received from his superiors in Washington that which they believed he needed to know. Husband Kimmel was denied access to classified information regarding the Japanese intentions within the realm of his command by officers in Washington.
This convoluted approach meant that while officers in Washington DC knew that the Japanese fleet was at sea in early December 1941, Kimmel did not, though he speculated that it was. The failure to provide raw intelligence to the fleet commander, if it was in fact a mistake, was corrected when Kimmel was made the scapegoat (along with army general Walter Short) for the United States being caught by surprise at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Chester Nimitz ordered the intelligence officers in Hawaii to provide him with any and all information which could possibly impact the Pacific Fleet and areas under his command, an order he made verbally and which violated official US Navy standard operating procedures. It was obeyed.