Italian unpreparedness
As early as 1938, German intelligence reported to Hitler that the Italians would be a burden upon Germany should Mussolini enter the war on their side. In virtually every measure of preparedness for war Italy fell woefully short. The Italian army had not distinguished itself in North Africa, nor during its intervention in the Spanish Civil War. Italy had a large and powerful surface fleet in the Mediterranean, but the navy was torn by class consciousness which adversely affected morale among the sailors of the fleet. It also lacked aircraft carriers, with the Italian admirals believing that land based air was sufficient to support the surface units.
As late as May of 1940, Hitler suggested to Mussolini that the Italians remain out of the war against France and Britain, adopting instead a policy of friendly neutrality. Mussolini kept the Italians out of the war until the fall of France was all but assured. Following Italy’s entry into the war, Hitler and Mussolini had several disagreements regarding French territorial cessions to the “Italian Empire”, which continued until the Axis invaded Vichy France in 1942. As had been predicted by the German High Command, defending Italy rapidly became a burden on the German military, and cooperation between the Italian army and their German counterparts was sporadic at best.