Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson – Seven Days Battles (1862)
The General
When it comes to Confederate generals, only one name competes with Robert E. Lee’s: Stonewall Jackson. Stonewall repeatedly outsmarted or outfought the Union at the Battles of Bull Run, Harper’s Ferry, and Fredericksburg. His rapid movements and skillful maneuvering throughout 1862’s Valley Campaign remain a staple of tactical classes at military institutions worldwide. Unlike other commanders on this list, Jackson was not single-handedly responsible for an unmitigated disaster. Several Confederate generals erred throughout the Seven Days Battles, but Jackson’s performance was so ridiculously sub-par, and insanely out of character, that it played a major role in the Union Army’s escape.
The Blunder
From June 25 to July 1, 1862, Confederate General Robert E. Lee pushed Union General George B. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond, VA, but did not inflict crippling losses due to Jackson’s repeated, and often inexplicable, failures. Throughout four of the six battles, Jackson either did not arrive on time or attack as ordered.
Beaver Dam Creek, June 26
Lee’s plan hinged on Jackson attacking the Union’s vulnerable north flank early in the morning. This attack was the signal for Generals Longstreet and A.P. Hill to launch their respective assaults, but Jackson did not arrive until late afternoon. Although Jackson notified Lee of his delay, fighting exploded when A.P. Hill attacked early. When Jackson arrived, he made the mystifying decision to bivouac his army rather than attack as ordered. Granted, Jackson was concerned about his men’s fatigue, but the battle was raging within earshot.
Gaines’s Mill, June 27
There are mitigating circumstances for his late arrival at Beaver Dam Creek, but there’s no excuse for Stonewall’s performance at Gaines’s Mill. Lee launched the largest Confederate attack of the war, roughly 57,000 men, and Jackson was ordered to flank the enemy and attack from the north. A maneuver he and his experienced corps accomplished repeatedly in the Valley Campaign. Jackson, however, got lost, dithered on arrival, and did not attack until 4:30 p.m., severely reducing Union losses.
Savage’s Station, June 29
Savage’s Station was one of those rare opportunities where a crafty commander could destroy the bulk of his enemy’s army. Union General George “There’s No Battle I Can’t Run Away From” McClellan was retreating, and Lee intended to crush the Army of Potomac between General Magruder and Stonewall Jackson’s forces. Jackson, however, crept forward at a snail’s pace and did not arrive until 2:30 a.m. the following day, which allowed the Union Army to escape.
Battle of Glendale, June 30
This was Lee’s last chance to destroy his enemy. The Union Army’s command structure was wrecked, morale was non-existent, and its defensive line was ragged. War, however, is unpredictable, and half of Lee’s commanders utterly failed. General Huger was delayed and never showed. Magruder wandered around confusedly until mid-afternoon. Jackson, arguably Lee’s best and most aggressive commander, spent the day skirmishing with the Union in meaningless artillery duels, attempting to rebuild an irrelevant bridge, and generally not attacking the enemy.