Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid
On August 17, 1943, the first anniversary of the commencement of its strategic bombing campaign, the Eighth US Air Force carried out an ambitious attack intended to cripple the German aircraft industry. The plan was to launch two simultaneous bombing raids against two vital targets in order to confuse and divide German air defenses, and disperse the Luftwaffe’s fighters by compelling them to protect both targets rather than concentrate against one bomber force.
The targets chosen were Regensburg, a center for the production of Bf 109 fighters, and Schweinfurt, which housed most of Germany’s ball-bearing industry. Both targets were beyond Allied fighter range, so the bombers would be escorted only part of the way, then continue on their own without fighter protection. The Schweinfurt bombing force would return to its bases in England after the raid, but to further confuse the Germans, the Regensburg force would fly south after dropping its bombs, and continue over the Alps and across the Mediterranean to land at airbases in Algeria and Tunisia. There, after refitting, refueling, and rearming, the bombers would return to England a few days later, bombing targets in Nazi-occupied France on their way back.
Seven groups of B-17 heavy bombers, totaling 146 aircraft, took off for Regensburg on August 17. Within minutes of crossing the coast into Europe, they were intercepted by German fighters, which harried them with mounting ferocity all the way to Regensburg. Of two Allied fighter groups scheduled to escort them part of the way, only one showed up on time to protect the lead bombers, while the other fighter group showed up 15 minutes late, during which time German fighters attacked the unprotected bombers with abandon. 15 bombers were lost before the German fighters, low on fuel and out of ammunition, returned to their airfields. The Regensburg force dropped its bombs against light antiaircraft fire, and turned south for North Africa. The Germans, not expecting that, did little to challenge their escape. Nine more airplanes were lost en route due to mechanical failures or running out of fuel, for a loss of 24 bombers, while another 60 of the 122 surviving B-17s were damaged.
The Schweinfurt force got it far worse. 230 B-17s, divided into 12 groups, took off that morning, but they had been delayed and started late. Thus, rather than fly simultaneously with the Regensburg force, overwhelming the German defenders with numbers, the German fighters had time to concentrate against the Regensburg force, maul it, return to their airfields to refuel and rearm, then take to the air again in time to challenge the Schweinfurt force.
The Schweinfurt bombers were further jinxed by weather, as high cloud masses compelled them to fly at lower-than-usual altitudes, where they were extra vulnerable to German fighters. Bf 109s and FW-190s fell on the B-17s with a ferocity never seen before, and which kept mounting the deeper the bombers penetrated into Germany, as over 300 German fighters attacked the Schweinfurt raiders. On the outskirts of Schweinfurt, the last German fighters, having already downed 22 bombers, returned to their airfields to refuel, rearm, and wait for another go at the bombers on their way back home. The Schweinfurt group lost 36 bombers shot down that day.
The targets suffered significant damage, but German industry was sufficiently resilient to soon make up the production shortfall. Ultimately, what the double raid demonstrated, particularly the Schweinfurt portion, was that daylight bombing raids deep inside Germany without fighter escorts were too hazardous and led to unsustainable losses. US Eighth Air Force commanders did not fully grasp that, however, until another bombing raid against Schweinfurt two months later, resulted in even heavier unsustainable losses.