Confederate General Outnumbered 10 to 1 Bamboozles Opponent Out of Taking Richmond
The American Civil War came close to ending in the spring of 1862. In March of that year, Union General George B. McClellan outflanked the Confederate main army in Northern Virginia by landing 121,000 men on the Virginia Peninsula to the south, between the James and York rivers. The goal was to march up the Peninsula and capture Richmond before the Confederates had time to rush in reinforcements to protect their capital. Things went smoothly at first, as McClellan successfully disembarked with no difficulty, and began marching on the Confederate capital.
All that stood between McClellan and Richmond were 12,000 Confederates at Yorktown, commanded by John B. Magruder, who found himself outnumbered 10 to 1 by Union forces. Magruder, realizing his small force stood no chance in a fight, and desperately needing to buy time until reinforcements arrived, set out to bamboozle McClellan into slowing down.
From a Confederate perspective, Magruder turned out to be the right man in the right place at the right time. He was known before the war for his florid manner, proneness to theatrics, and ostentatious displays. Magruder now resorted to theatrics and display to put on a show and trick McClellan into believing that he faced far stronger opposition than was the case.
Taking advantage of the small Warwick river which separated him from the advancing federals, Magruder set out to convince McClellan that its 14 mile length on the opposite bank was heavily fortified and strongly garrisoned. While the fortifications were real, Magruder lacked the men to occupy them in any strength that could have stopped McClellan had he attacked.
Magruder ordered his forces to create a din, with drumrolls and men cheering in woods behind the lines, to fool their foes into believing the Confederate were more numerous than they actually were. He also made repeated use of a single column of men, marching them within sight of the federals to take up positions on the defensive line. He would then slip them away outside the Union observers’ line of sight, reassemble them in column, and march them back to the defensive line to take up defensive positions once more.
The theatrics convinced McClellan that the Confederate positions were too strong for a frontal attack. It was a task made easier by McClellan’s predisposition to take counsel of his fears, and to constantly believe himself outnumbered. Although he could have simply bulled through, swatted Magruder aside, and seized Richmond, McClellan ordered a halt on his side of the Warwick river, had his men dig in, and set out to conduct a siege.
For a month, McClellan methodically prepared a powerful attack to break through Magruder’s “strong defenses”. He concentrated men, guns, and munitions for a massive bombardment scheduled for May 5, 1862, followed by an overwhelming assault. Magruder had no intention of waiting to get attacked. Having already bought his side a month to prepare the defenses of Richmond, Magruder slipped away on the night of May 3rd, leaving behind empty trenches for the enemy to occupy.
McClellan resumed his advance on Richmond. By then, however, the Confederates had concentrated sufficient forces to defend their capital, and the Union commander was halted at the gates of Richmond. McClelland was then pushed back to his starting point with furious attacks during the Seven Days Battles, and the Peninsula Campaign came to an ignominious end.