Economic Sanctions
By 1940, Churchill, who was now First Lord of the Admiralty, frustrated with de Valera’s unwillingness to allow Britain access to these ports asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood to devise a plan to punish the Republic for its insubordination. Wood instructed the Ministry of Shipping to withdraw charter facilities to the Republic, which resulted in the country receiving only 25% of its needs during the war. What Wood had instituted in effect was the implementation of economic sanctions on the Republic where supplies of fuel and other commodities would be greatly reduced for the duration of the Second World War.
In response to these shortages, the Irish government appointed Sean Lemass as Minister for Supplies, whose primary responsibility was to deal with the rationing of goods during the period known as ‘The Emergency‘. In December 1940, petrol pumps ran dry all over the country. Reacting to news that the three main British distributors had informed their Irish subsidiaries that petrol supplies might be cut off completely the government forbade petrol sales temporarily to check stocks. Upon resumption of sales, the ration for private motorists was reduced by three-quarters.
Supplies of coal were also affected, being cut to half a ton a month before being removed altogether for domestic use. Rations were imposed on tea in January 1941. A ration of two ounces per week was introduced before being reduced to one ounce at the beginning of April, which was then cut by half a few days later. Wheat imports were stopped completely and a policy of compulsory tillage was introduced to meet demand. Farmers increased the pre-war tillage area by one million acres, wheat jumped from 21,000 acres in 1932 to 230,000 in 1938 and 640,000 in 1944.
Early in 1942, the informal committee under the Dominions Secretary, assigned by Churchill in 1941 to maintain a persistent economic pressure on Ireland, was reconstructed as a full war cabinet committee under Clement Atlee. The committee’s general policy was one of keeping the Republics’ economy operating “on a minimum basis.”
In the six counties of Northern Ireland, which was part of the United Kingdom and therefore at war, Nationalists loyal to the Republic and who sought a united Ireland, wholly supported the Republics’ decision to remain neutral. They viewed the partition of Ireland and the British military occupation of Northern Ireland as reason enough to abstain from supporting Britain in the war effort.
On the opposite side of the political divide in the North, the biggest fear for Unionists was that of Chamberlain’s offer of Irish unity in exchange for an end to neutrality in the Republic. Unionist fears were quickly averted by de Valera’s refusal for any such deal; his decision undoubtedly influenced by the ill-fated judgment of the then leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, John Redmond, to support Britain in the First World War.