9. What is True and Untrue About the Impact of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact bought the Soviets nearly two years in which to prepare for war. Stalin did not make the best use of that time, but it is untrue that the USSR did not benefit from that period of peace. Poor as the Soviet military’s performance was in 1941, it was even less prepared for war in 1939. Moreover, the Pact, which gave the USSR nearly half of Poland, pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of miles westwards. That gave the USSR additional buffer space. Space and distance proved decisive to Soviet survival in 1941: the Germans came within 10 miles of the Kremlin before they were turned back. Without the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Germans would have launched their invasion from a start line hundreds of miles further to the east.
The same effort that ran out of steam within sight of the Kremlin might have pushed far beyond had it started hundreds of miles closer to Moscow. As the Soviets saw it, they owed the Western Powers and Poland nothing. Indeed, they had outstanding border claims against Poland. The Germans offered to satisfy those claims, while the British and French offered little. The Soviets were expected to do the bulk of the fighting and dying in a war against Germany. It thus seemed like chutzpah for Germany’s foes to offer so little in exchange for the high price the USSR would pay for siding with them. So the Soviets chose instead to sign a benevolent neutrality agreement with Germany.