Political ramifications of Operation Dragoon
Winston Churchill argued fiercely against Operation Dragoon throughout its planning stages, believing the forces involved could be better used elsewhere. Churchill favored a southern invasion of Europe, directed towards the Balkans, which he long believed to be within the British sphere of influence. He believed that Allied occupation of the oil fields and the Balkan territories would stop the Soviet influence in the area in post-war Europe, and the American lack of interest in the area would increase the influence of the British Empire following the war, as it would in the Middle East in his mind. After the success of Operation Dragoon his opinion of it as futile did not falter.
Montgomery agreed with his Prime Minister and argued against the use of British Empire troops in the operation, beyond that of the commandos. The Royal Navy provided support for two reasons; it had long considered the Mediterranean to be its main concern, linking Gibraltar to Suez and the Empire. The Royal Navy was not ready to cede control of the Mediterranean to the United States, neither during the remainder of the war or in its view of the post-war world. Montgomery also believed that the troops involved in Operation Dragoon should have been assigned to him in support of Market Garden, and blamed Dragoon in part as the cause of his operation’s failure.
The French were eager to implement Operation Dragoon, with de Gaulle arguing relentlessly for its execution and extensive French involvement, which in the event occurred. The operations to capture and re-establish the ports of Toulon and Marseille were French controlled, executed with largely French colonial troops, and Free French forces secured VI Corps’ flank during the advance to Dijon. De Gaulle used these actions to trumpet the achievements of the French Army in liberating their homeland, despite many of the troops in French uniforms being thousands of miles from their homelands.
Josef Stalin strongly supported the landings in southern France, both for the increased pressure it put upon the Germans and because it left the Balkans for the Soviet Army to overrun. Stalin first argued for an invasion of southern France supported by bases in North Africa as early as 1943 as part of his demands for the Allies to open a second front in Europe. He preferred the Allies attack the Germans in France rather than the Germans and Italians in Sicily and Italy, for geopolitical and strategic reasons. By 1944 Stalin and the surging Soviet Army were fighting a war of conquest in Eastern Europe, and a second front was desirable, as long as it was far away from the Russian front.
During Operation Dragoon Patton’s Third Army was advancing with increasing speed, to the delight of the war correspondents traveling with the flamboyant general. Patton was always good for a headline and the correspondents filed reports which their newspapers printed under banner headlines. The advance of Operation Dragoon, accomplished with almost startling speed, was reported in a far less conspicuous fashion after the first few days. Patton made good copy, Lucian Truscott did not, and the French contribution was of little interest to American readers. Despite its tremendous success, Operation Dragoon was treated in the press as little more than a sideshow.