4. Washington bureaucrats blamed torpedo failures on submarine crews
By June, 1942, over 800 torpedoes had been fired by US submarines in combat, with a high percentage failing to explode or exploding prematurely. The number of torpedoes fired exceeded the rate of production of the Navy’s facilities. The submarine force fired more torpedoes than its contractors could supply, and having entered the war already experiencing a shortage, the situation became critical. Worse, submarine commanders reported an increasing amount of torpedo failures during the summer of 1942. In August, after independent testing conducted by Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood confirmed the Mark 14 ran too deep due to design problems, the Bureau of Ordnance agreed.
Once the depth problem was identified and resolved, submarine skippers confirmed an increase in the number of hits on targets, but no sinkings. Most submarine commanders believed the problems came from the Mark 6 magnetic exploder, and petitioned their superiors to remove it. With their request denied by higher-ups, many resorted to removing the exploders after their ships departed for patrol. Once again, the Bureau of Ordnance, Congressional oversight committees, and the Naval bureaucracy spent their time arguing over the issue, while submarine skippers struggled to find the means of gaining reliability over the weapon upon which their lives most depended.