15. Battling contractors became a major issue for Rickover in the early 1960s
By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines in commission, another 30 under construction, two nuclear-powered surface ships, the carrier Enterprise and the cruiser Long Beach, and a third surface ship readying for commissioning. Rickover’s branch included representatives at all the laboratories, shipyards, contractors, major subcontractors, and fleet commands. At least one representative at every location was required to complete a written report on observations, problems, and solutions to Admiral Rickover weekly. They were called Rickover’s “spies”. It was the Admiral’s practice to personally take part in certifying each ship’s engineering plant before it became operational, and with exceptions only for illness Rickover rode each boat on its initial sea trials. Needless to say, the Admiral was a busy man.
He refused to relax his standards screening men for acceptance into his nuclear program, despite pressures from seniors complaining of a shortage of qualified crewmen. He also resisted the pressures of builders and contractors to relax equipment standards, or provide waivers when the equipment was not perfect but was close enough. To Rickover, close enough meant substandard, which was wholly unacceptable. He also felt many of the standards applied to submarine construction were in fact not strict enough, particularly in areas of pipe joints, Many of these were brazed rather than welded. Rickover insisted that all joints in the reactor compartment, the only area of the submarine in which he held total control, were to be welded. He dealt with recalcitrant contractors by refusing to pay them, and by demanding outside inspections of welds and pipe fittings. This caused delays and adversely affected operational demands. Rickover refused to yield.